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THE VIRGINIA CONSPIRACY STATUTE PART II:
LIABILITY OF CONSPIRATORS FOR COMPELLING
ANOTHER TO ACT AGAINST HIS WILL OR
CONSTRAINING ANOTHER FROM DOING A
LAWFUL ACT
BY JOSEPH E. ULRICH* & KILLIS T. HOWARD**
Virginia1 and Wisconsin2 have essentially the same conspiracy
statute. Each statute contains two separate prohibitions, one dealing
with conspiracies injuring business and one with conspiracies to compel
or constrain conduct. Unlike Wisconsin's, the Virginia statute grants a
triple damage remedy for violation of the first part of the statute,' but
like its prototype, the Virginia statute does not include an express
damage remedy for violation of the second.4 Both statutes impose
criminal penalties.'
In a prior article,' we considered the first part of the Virginia
statute. Because of the punitive character of the triple damages remedy,
we offered a construction of the conspiracies to injure business part that
would limit its use to cases in which the defendant inflicted harm on the
plaintiff because of ill will.7 In the alternative, we suggested the repeal
of the triple damages provision, noting that if this suggestion were
* Professor of Law, Washington & Lee University. This study was made possible in
part by a grant from the Frances Lewis Law Center. The authors wish to thank Professor
Frederick L. Kirgis for his helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article and Ms.
Patricia Brown, a third year law student at Washington and Lee, for her research
assistance.
** Member, Lynchburg, Virginia Bar.
1 VA. CODS § 18.2-499(a) (1975). The Virginia conspiracy statute states:
(a) Any two or more persons who shall combine, associate, agree, mutually under-
take or concert together for the purpose of willfully and maliciously injuring
another in his reputation, trade, business or profession by any means whatever, or
for the purpose of willfully and maliciously compelling another to do or perform
any act against his will, or preventing or hindering another from doing or per-
forming any lawful act, shall be jointly and severally guilty of a Class 3 misde-
meanor. Such punishment shall be in addition to any civil relief recoverable.
2 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 134.01 (West 1975).
3 VA. CODE § 18.2-500(a) (1975).
' Id Wisconsin courts have long implied a civil damage remedy for violation of the
second part of the conspiracy statute. Randall v. Lonstorf, 126 Wis. 147,-, 105 N.W. 663,
664 (1905).
The criminal penalties provided by the two statutes are roughly analogous. Com-
pare VA. CODE § 18.2-11(c) 1975 (fine not exceeding $500) with WIs. STAT. ANN. § 134.01
(West 1975) (fine not exceeding $500 or imprisonment not exceeding one year).
'Ulrich & Howard, Injuries to Business Under the Virginia Conspiracy Statute: A
Sleeping Giant, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 377 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Ulrich & Howard].
1 Id. at 406-10.
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adopted, a broader construction of the statute would be preferable!
Either approach, of course, greatly reduces the statute's impact.
This article will focus upon the scope of the second part, conspiracies
to compel or constrain another. The only judicial statement of the second
part's purpose may be found in Randall v. Lonstorft in which the Wiscon-
sin court distinguished the two parts of its statute in the following man-
ner:
The first part of this section evidently was intended to cover
conspiracies against another in his trade or business, but the sec-
ond part of the act just as evidently was intended to cover
another and broader field, namely, conspiracies maliciously in-
tended to coerce or constrain the action of another by compelling
him to do that which is against his will, or to refrain from doing
any lawful act which he desires to do.10
Such comments do not preclude speculation concerning the scope of the
statute.
We will treat the two issues which seem fundamental to us. First,
whether the second part of this statute should be viewed as coextensive
with the tort of civil conspiracy, or, in the alternative, whether the
legislature intended the courts to develop a body of case law indepen-
dent of the traditional tort concepts which have already evolved in this
area. As yet no reported Virginia cases have examined this issue."
Several Wisconsin cases, however, have applied the second part of the
statute to extend traditional tort law. 2 In pursuing our first inquiry we
will describe the contours of civil conspiracy as a common law tort, and
then consider Wisconsin's treatment of the second part of its statute.
Our conclusion to the initial inquiry is that a court would not be compelled
to adopt either construction. Having set forth our position on the first
issue we shall turn to the second, should the General Assembly repeal
the statute? We think the answer is yes, and in the last part of this arti-
cle we set forth our reasons for this recommendation.
Civil Conspiracy 3
Conspiracy, both criminal and civil, generally has been defined as a
combination of two or more parties to accomplish by concerted action a
Id at 410-12.
126 Wis. 147, 105 N.W. 663 (1905).
,Id. at - , 105 N.W. at 664 (emphasis added).
n Several Virginia cases have considered the first part of the conspiracy statute. See
note 98 infra.
"See text accompanying notes 66-96 infra.
" See generally Note, Civil Conspiracy: A Substantive Tort?, 59 B. U. L. REV. 921
(1979) [hereinafter cited as Boston Note]. The development of civil conspiracy from its
criminal counterpart is briefly outlined in P. WINFIELD, A TEXT BOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRTs
663-64 (7th ed. Jolowicz & Lewis 1963). The history of conspiracy as a crime is set forth by
Sayre, Criminal Conspiracy, 35 HARV. L. REV. 393 (1922) [hereinafter cited as Sayre].
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criminal or unlawful object, or a lawful object by criminal or unlawful
means." In jurisdictions which recognize a separate tort of civil con-
spiracy,"6 the plaintiff must prove three elements:6 formation of the con-
spiracy; a wrongful act or acts pursuant to the conspiracy; and damage
inflicted upon the plaintiff by such act or acts. 17 Once the plaintiff has
established a prima facie case, the defendant may offer evidence of
privilege. 8 If the plaintiff is granted judgment, joint and several liability
is extended to members of the conspiracy other than the actual wrong-
doer. 9
Courts and treatise writers have offered the above skeletal descrip-
tion of civil conspiracy as a guide. Like most generalizations it leaves a
number of questions unanswered. Is civil conspiracy a distinct tort?
Does the existence of a combination make acts unlawful that would be
perfectly legitimate if done by an individual? While many courts have
answered such questions "yes," a careful reading of these holdings
shows that the joint activities of the defendants ordinarily could have
11 The generally accepted definition of conspiracy is based on Lord Debman's well
known epigram that a conspiracy indictment must "charge a conspiracy either to do an
unlawful act or a lawful act by unlawful means." King v. Jones, 110 Eng. Rep. 485, 487 (K.B.
1832). Prior to this decision most cases had held that the object of the conspiracy or the
means used must be in fact criminal. According to Professor Sayre, "[Like the magic jingle
in some fairy tale, through whose potency the betwitched adventurer is delivered from all
his troubles, this famous [Dehman's] formula was seized upon by judges laboring bewildered
through the mazes of the conspiracy cases as a ready solution for all their difficulties."
Sayre, supra note 13, at 405. Lord Dehman's definition is employed in civil cases as well.
See, e.g., Ross v. Peck Iron and Metal Co., 264 F.2d 262, 268 (4th Cir. 1959) (Virginia law).
,S Some decisions have held that conspiracy is not a separate tort, but merely a theory
of joint liability whereby a court may hold all who cooperate in another's wrong responsible.
See, e.g., Perry v. Apache Junction Elementary School Dist., 20 Ariz. App. 561, 514 P.2d 514
(1973); Cohen v. Bowdoin, 288 A.2d 106 (Me. 1972).
,O 0nderdonk v. Lamb, 79 Wis. 2d 241,247,255 N.W.2d 507,510 (1971) (quoting Wise v.
Southern Pac. Co., 223 Cal. App. 2d 50, -, 35 Cal. Rptr. 652, 660 (1963)). Other commen-
tators have broken down the elements of conspiracy somewhat differently. See Boston
Note, supra note 13, at 928-37.
1 Unlike the criminal law which condemns the agreement itself, a civil conspiracy is
not actionable unless acts performed pursuant thereto cause injury to the plaintiff. The
courts commonly state this distinction by saying that damage is the gist of the action, not
the conspiracy. See, e.g., Gallop v. Sharp, 179 Va. 335, 19 S.E.2d 84 (1942). See also text ac-
companying notes 71-73 infra.
, Although cases often do not refer to the privilege defense, defendants are not held
strictly liable for intentionally inflicting harm. Defendants may offer justification for their
actions. See, e.g., American Well Works Co. v. Layne and Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257 (1916).
11 Commenting on joint and several liability, one court stated, "The charge of con-
spiracy in a civil action is merely the string whereby the plaintiff seeks to tie together those
who, acting in concert, may be held responsible in damages for any overt act or acts."
Rutkin v. Reinfeld, 229 F.2d 248, 252 (2d Cir. 1956).
2 Compare Charlesworth, Conspiracy as a Ground of Liability in Tort, 36 L. Q. REV.
38 (1920) [hereinafter cited as Charlesworth]; Burdick, The Tort of Conspiracy, 8 COLUM. L.
REv. 117 (1908); Burdick, Conspiracy as a Crime and as a Tort, 7 COLUm. L. REV. 209 (1907)
(concluding that combination makes legitimate individual acts illegitimate) with Hughes,
The Tort of Conspiracy, 15 MOD. L. REv. 209 (1952) [hereinafter cited as Hughes] (taking the
opposite position).
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been characterized as a recognized nonconspiracy tort.2 ' Indeed, the tort
of civil conspiracy appears to rest on a logical flaw. Professor Hughes'
sets forth this proposition cogently. Referring to the standard definition
of conspiracy he asserts:
This definition would seem to be based on a fallacy in logic. For
it is generally agreed that unlike the crime of conspiracy, the
mere fact of agreement could not constitute the tort. To give rise
to tortious liability there must be some carrying out of the
agreement, causing damage. But it would seem evident that if
there is some carrying out of the agreement to do an unlawful
act or to employ unlawful means, then this is the equivalent to
the doing of an unlawful act. In other words, under this defini-
tion, the existence of a tort of conspiracy would be quite otiose,
for the defendants could always be such as joint tortfeasors
under some other specific heading of tortious liability.-
Nonetheless, the courts have invoked the conspiracy concept to ex-
pand the ambit of liability in order to reflect the social and economic
policy of the community as divined by the judges." The impetus for ex-
panding liability through the fiction' of conspiracy rests upon two
2 See text accompanying notes 51-62 infra. See also Note, Refusal to Deal as a
Tort- Conspiracy in a Civil Suit, 45 ILL. L. REV. 784, 788-91 (1951).
Hughes, supra note 20, at 209.
2Id.
2See J. FLEMING, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF TORTS (1967). Perhaps the clearest
case of the use of the judicial expansion of the conspiracy concept to carry out community
policy came in the area of union activity around the turn of the century in both England and
the United States. The courts used the concept of conspiracy in conjunction with the
developing tort of inducement for breach of contract to engage in active judicial interven-
tion for the purpose of breaking strikes:
The weapon thus fashioned was indeed for a time wielded by the courts in pro-
moting, unabashed and unextended, the economic interest of the dominant en-
trepenurial class against the aspirations of the emerging labour movement. Alike
in their use of civil and criminal sanctions, the conspiracy doctrine was exploited
throughout the 19th century in a manner which gave edge to the marks in
postulate that the courts were only handmaidens to the ruling class in defense of
their economic position against the perennial challenge by the underprivileged.
About the turn of the 20th century this bald partisanship came to falter and was
eventually replaced by the current doctrine of judicial neutrality.
Id at 225.
The U.S. Supreme Court has made the same points: "The tort of 'conspiracy' is poorly
defined and highly susceptible to judicial expansion; its relatively brief history is colored by
use as a weapon against the developing labor movement." United Mine Workers v. Gibbs,
383 U.S. 715, 732 (1966).
1 Fictions are commonly used in tort law. By using such a term we have no intention
of being derogatory. A fiction is generally used to fill in a gap, ordinarily of fact, to get a
good result. Transferred intent is one example. See, e.g., Bannister v. Mitchell, 127 Va. 578,
104 S.E. 800 (1920). In this context it means that a particular purpose to invade the
plaintiff's interest will not be required to prove battery. If the defendant attempts to strike
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separate deeply-held notions. First, there is the fear of group activity.
This fear results from a notion that an organized body of people can pro-
duce results more oppressive or dangerous than the results produced by
a single person." While this distinction between individual and joint ac-
tion probably made more sense at the turn of the century than it does
now,' it still persists.
The second notion is that redress should be granted for all inten-
tionally inflicted harms to another. This sentiment undoubtedly under-
lies the concept of the prima facie tort,' a theory whose time has not ar-
rived." Nonetheless, a number of nominate torts which have developed
within the last 100 years probably owe their current existence to this
judicial propensity. The development is most extensive in the area of in-
tentionally inflicted economic losses. 0 Torts such as deceit, 1 injurious
A but hits P in the process, P may recover unless privilege is demonstrated. Defendants
may also establish defenses based on fictions. For example, implied consent has been
developed to protect doctors in appropriate cases. See C. MORRIS & S. MORRIS, MORRIS ON
TORTS 26-28 (2d ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as MORRIS ON TORTS]. For the place of fictions in
the law see L. FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS (1967).
Shaltupsky v. Brown Shoe Co., 350 Mo. 831, , 168 S.W.2d 1083, 1086 (1943). See
generally RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 765, comments (a) & (b) (1939). Cf. R. PERKINs, CRIMINAL
LAW 614 (2d ed. 1957) (conspiracy in criminal law).
- Pollock strongly opposed recognizing conspiracy as a tort. Thus, to the argument
that a person could resist without much difficulty the wrongful act of an individual but coer-
don by many would be harder to resist, he responded, "the most powerful corporation is an
individual before the law. Moreover individual natural persons, a Rockefeller or a Carnegie,
may be very powerful." F. POLLOCK, LAW OF TORTS 258 n. (x) (14th ed. Landon 1939)
[hereinafter cited as POLLOCK ON TORTS]. While we might add labor unions to the list, our
response probably still would be in accord with Pollock.
The prima facie tort doctrine originally was formulated in England by Lord Bowen
in the Mogul Steamship case. Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor, Gow and Co. (1889), 23
Q.B.D. 598; [1892] A.C. 25. See generally F. POLLOCK, LAW OF TORTS 21 (1887). The first
American formulation of the prima facie tort doctrine occured in Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195
U.S. 194 (1904). In Aikens, the court held that the Wisconsin injuries to business statute, the
forerunner to Virginia's conspiracy statute, did not violate the 14th amendment. Id. at 205.
In the course of his opinion Justice Holmes stated: "It has been considered that primafacie,
the intentional infliction of temporal damage is a cause of action which, as a matter of
substantive law, whatever may be the form of the pleading, requires the justification if the
defendant is to escape [liabilities]." Id at 204.
2 See generally Brown, The Rise and Threatened Demise of the Prima Facie Torts
Principle, 54 Nw. U.L. REV. 563 (1959); Halpern, Intentional Torts Under Restatement, 7
BUFFALO L. REV. 7 (1957). While the prima facie tort doctrine's primary significance may
have been to broaden torts doctrines since the turn of the century, it adds little to tradi-
tional tort concepts in enabling the courts to choose and weigh the factors relevant to each
particular case. Green, Protection of Trade Relations Under Tort Law, 47 VA. L. REV. 559,
569-73 (1961).
Professor Heydon, recounting the progress of English law over the last one-hundred
years, characterized the judicial sentiment for granting redress for all intentional torts as a
"groping towards an embryonic innominate tort of causing intentional economic loss by
'unlawful' means." Heydon, The Defense of Justification in Cases of Intentionally Caused
Economic Loss, 20 U. TORONTO L.J. 139, 139 (1970).
31 See generally MORRIS ON TORTS, supra note 25, at 291-328.
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falsehood, 2 and misappropriation' evolved through this process. To the
list one should probably add such noneconomic torts as intentional inflic-
tion of mental distress' and invasion of privacy. 5 Concommitant with
the development of these torts, the courts extended recognized concepts
such as inducement of breach of contract" and conspiracy to give relief
for injury caused by activity not easily pigeon-holed within conventional
labels.
The two strongly felt sentiments have sensitized judges to the need
for relief in conspiracy cases. Once a plaintiff establishes a combination
inflicting harm, the courts become eager to find such conduct wrongful.
The legal theory used by the court may take several different forms. The
context may convince the court that the time is ripe to redefine an
established tort, to carve an exception into a received rule of nonliability,
or expand liability covertly. Only in a very limited number of cases has
the existence of conspiracy been considered determinative.
From this perspective, consideration of the classic boycott case,
Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor, Gow and Co. 7 is appropriate. The
Mogul court declined to afford relief against a combination of traders
organized to retain a monopoly of the China tea trade by destroying
plaintiff's business through economically coercive tactics on the in-
dustry's customers. The opinion emphasized that the defendants engaged
in no tortious activity. Rather, they did no more "to the plaintiffs than to
pursue to the bitter end the war of competition waged in the interest of
their own trade."' Since the defendant's purpose was self advancement
and the destruction of the plaintiff's business was only incidental thereto
and involved no malice, such conduct was privileged. 9
I See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 128 (4th ed. 1971)
[hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
I International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918). Whether this
case still has any real significance is unclear. See R. CALLMAN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETI-
TION, Trademarks & Monopoly Chap. 15 (3d ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as UNFAIR CoMPI-
TION].
See generally Prosser, Insult & Outrage, 44 CALIF. L. REV. 40 (1956).
See generally Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383 (1960); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 767 (1975).
" The tort of interference with contractual relation was first stated in Lumley v. Gye,
118 Eng. Rep. 1083 (1853), but its existence was not firmly established until Quinn &
Leathem, [1901] A.C. 495. In Quinn the court held that union activity aimed at coercing an
employer to replace his nonunion workers with members of the union was actionable as a
conspiracy to induce breach of contract. As indicated above both English and American
courts used the conspiracy concept in an effort to regulate union activity. See note 24 supra.
The Wisconsin conspiracy statute may well have been enacted as part of the state's effort to
curtail union activity. The wording of the Wisconsin statute, however, precludes such use.
Cf. VA. CODE § 18.2-499(b) (1950). See Trade Press Publishing Company v. Moore, 180 Wis.
449, 193 N.W. 507 (1920).
' (1889) 23 Q.B.D. 598; [1892] A.C. 25.
I& at 614.
Id. at 49 (L. Morris). Mogul wis a conspiracy case. As Professor Charlesworth notes,
however, nonliability was the only decision the English court could have reached under the
prevailing ethos. Professor Charlesworth states:
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The finding that no "intimidation," defined as physical interference,
was present is crucial to the result in Mogul. But "intimidation"'40 is not
always defined so narrowly. Some courts have defined intimidation to in-
clude the coercive economic methods employed by the defendants in
Mogul. The court in Jackson v. Stanfield,1 a case quite similar to Mogul,
expanded the definition to reach the desired result. First, the court em-
phasized the existence of a conspiracy, thereby focusing attention more
sharply on both the source and the potential extent of the harm. From
this perspective, economic coercion appeared as dangerous to a business
as physical interference, and the final short step of equating physical
and economic interference is inevitable. 2 Once the court sets up this
equation, the presence of a conspiracy becomes irrelevant. Nonetheless,
the Jackson court and many others often have traveled this route under
the banner of conspiracy.'
In many instances a court will invoke conspiracy as a basis for an ex-
ception to a longstanding, well recognized rule. In Snipes v. West
Flagler Kennel Club, Inc.," plaintiff alleged that five race track corpora-
tions conspired to prevent him from racing his dogs on defendants'
tracks, solely for the purpose of ruining the plaintiff financially. 5 After
A contrary decision, indeed, would have upset the whole business world, and
would have made it impossible for a newcomer, or two in partnership, to start any
business, as every customer they got would have been at the expense of someone
or other. The decision, then, merely emphasises the necessity of proving that the
defendant's conspiracy was to employ unlawful means, as there is no authority for
saying that the intentional infliction of damage by the employment lawful means
is actionable.
Charlesworth, supra note 20, at 39-40 (citing Mayor v. Pickles, [1895] A.C. 587). For a similar
view by an American writer, see Green, Relational Interests, 30 ILL. L. REv. 1, 20-23 (1935).
' See generally UNFAiR COMPErrION, supra note 33, § 50. For an example of a court
carrying the theory of physical intimidation to its outer limits, see Shamhart v. Morrison
Cafeteria Co., 159 Fla. 629, 32 So.2d 727 (1947).
" 36 N.E. 345 (Ind. 1894).
The Jackson court stated:
[Wrhere the policy pursued against a trade or business is of a menacing character,
calculated to destroy or injure the business of the person so engaged, either by
threats or intimidation, it becomes unlawful, and the person inflicting the wrong is
amenable to the injured party in a civil action for damages therefor. It is not a
mere passive, let-alone policy, a withdrawal of all business relations, intercourse,
and fellowship, that creates the liability, but the threats and intimidation shown
in the complaint.
Id. at page 351.
I See Crump v. Commonwealth, 84 Va. 927 (1888), in which the court characterizes the
"intimidation" inherent to a secondary union boycott in language identical to that employed
in Jackson. See also notes 24 & 36 supra.
In the United States union activity is regulated by statute rather than common law
torts or criminal law. Ulrich & Howard, supra note 6, at note 107. The English courts, on the
other hand, reconciled the union conspiracy cases with Mogul by holding that if a strike
were merely for the purpose of advancing union objectives, the strike was within the letter
of the privilege stated by Mogul. Crofter Hand Woven Harris Tweed Co. v. Veitch, [1942]
A.C. 435.
105 So. 2d 164 (Fla. 1958).
Id. at 165.
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conceding that the defendants' acts if performed individually would have
been lawful and that generally civil conspiracy was not an independent
tort," the court adopted a line of Massachusetts cases recognizing an ex-
ception to the general rule where "the force of numbers" of many defen-
dants gives them peculiar power over a plaintiff." Of course, it was un-
necessary to embrace such an amorphous standard. Instead, the court
could have adopted the traditional position, that the plaintiffs allega-
tions of a concerted refusal to deal sufficiently stated a malicious
injury.48 Since unilateral refusals to deal are privileged generally, 9 the
allegation of conspiracy was necessary only to demonstrate lack of justi-
fication for the defendant's actions."
In other conspiracy cases, courts have declared that concerted action
is crucial to a finding of illegality, yet the conduct challenged was clearly
tortious in itself. Keviczky v. Lorber5' illustrates this proclivity. The
opinion begins by stating that concerted activity may render otherwise
lawful conduct unlawful where there is an "element of illegality" present
and concludes that cheating a real estate broker of his commission is a
tort. How the conspiracy doctrine affected this result is unclear.2
Possibly the court knowingly employed conspiracy doctrine to obscure
the fact that it was expanding the law's protection.
53
" The basis for this position, said the Snipes court, was that "the gist of a civil action
for conspiracy is not the conspiracy itself, but the civil wrong which is alleged to have been
done pursuant to the conspiracy." Id (quoting Loeb v. Geronemus, 66 So.2d 241, 243 (Fla.
1953)).
11 105 So.2d at 165. The court in Snipes pointed to its decision in Liappas v. Augoustus,
47 So.2d 582 (Fla. 1950). The Liappas court in dictum referred to the force of numbers excep-
tion. The Massachusetts rule referred to by the court is reviewed in Boston Note, supra
note 13, at 937-40.
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 709 & 765 (1938).
" RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 762-64 (1938).
See Ulrich & Howard, supra note 6, at 387-94, for a discussion of the distinction be-
tween unilateral and concerted refusals to deal at common law. In Margolin v. Morton F.
Plant Hosp. Ass'n, 342 So.2d 1090 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977), a surgeon alleged that he had
been maliciously precluded from operating at the defendant hospital by the conspiratorial
refusal to its staff anesthesiologists to render services for him. To support his claim for
relief, he cited Snipes and relied on its "force of numbers" exception. In reversing the trial
judge's sustaining of defendant's demurrer, the appeals court stated that the traditional
balancing test of RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 765 (1938) was the same as that stated in Snipes.
342 So.2d at 1093-94.
290 N.Y. 297, 49 N.E. 2d 146 (1943).
Other jurisdictions had reached this result without the aid of the conspiracy doc-
trine. See, e.g., Krigbaum v. Sbarbaro, 23 Cal. App. 427, 138 P. 364 (1913); Kovar v. Bremer,
281 IM. App. 505 (1935).
'3 Quite often judges write in a way that obscures their true reasons for decision. For
example, in Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303 (1927), defendants negli-
gently damaged a boat owned by a third party. The defendants had contracted to repair the
boat. The harm to the boat prevented plaintiff, who had hired the boat, from fulfilling a pro-
fitable contract. Justice Holmes denied plaintiff a recovery with little more than the cryptic
remark that "the law does not spread its protection so far." Id at 309. Whether Holmes
thought plaintiff's claim failed because of no privity of contract with the wrongdoer, no
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Schultz v. Frankfort Marine Accident & Plate Glass Ins. Co.," may
be a better illustration of this technique. Defendants allegedly conspired
to "rough shadow" the plaintiff, in order to harass and intimidate him so
much that he would not testify against defendant insurance company in
then pending litigation. "Rough shadowing" involves following a person
openly so that both he and the public know he is being followed. The
defendant admitted hiring a private eye to shadow plaintiff, but justified
the action on the ground that it wanted to know of plaintiff's where-
abouts until it decided whether or not to have him arrested.5 The trial
court's directed verdict for defendant was reversed." The appellate
court held that rough shadowing is sufficiently analogous to libel" to be
actionable, for it is equivalent to the public proclamation that the one
followed is suspect and deserves watching. The Schultz court state:
[TIhe acts here complained of are the analogue of libel, except
the writing, printing, and passing around. But these elements are
supplied by the public, notorious, and a continued character of
the surveillance. We must hold that rough or open shadowing as
here described is an unlawful act resulting in legal injury to the
reputation of the person who is the object of such attentions ....
A conspiracy to libel the plaintiff or to commit any other wrong
to his person, reputation, or property may when damages follow
be the subject of civil action.M
property right in potential profits, failure to demonstrate proximate cause, or some other
reason will remain a mystery. Another great judge, Cardozo, offered the same language in
denying liability in H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 247 N.Y. 160, 159 N.E. 896
(1928) in an equally unrevealing opinion. Such tactics leave judges ample room to maneuver
in subsequent cases.
152 Wis. 537, 139 N.W. 386 (1913).
The Wisconsin Supreme Court in Schultz rejected the defendant's justification on
the dual ground that the private detective was not authorized to engage in activities to en-
force the criminal law any more than any other private citizen, and that his conduct violated
the Wisconsin conspiracy statute by restraining plaintiff from doing a lawful act. Id. at
-, 139 N.W. 390-91. See text accompanying notes 92-95 infra (effect of the statute in this
case).
. Whether the trial court's decision was based on plaintiff's failure to prove a substan-
tive violation or defendant's proof of a complete privilege is unclear.
In concluding that rough shadowing is analogous to libel, the Schultz court reasoned:
It can scarcely be doubted that the publication of a cartoon showing the plaintiff
followed and watched by detectives who pursue and watch him by day, and stand
guard on the sidewalk in front of his house at night, would within the principle of
the foregoing cases be an actionable liable-an injury to plaintiff's reputation.
How, then, can it be said that the acts which the picture represents accompanied
with equal publicity do not constitute an injury to reputation? Can we say they
are actionable when represented by picture, but nonactionable when actually com-
mitted? It must be conceded that to publicly proclaim one suspect, to publicly
charge that he deserves watching, and that he is being followed and watched does
subject him to public disrepute, ridicule, and contempt.
152 Wis. at -, 139 N.W. at 389-90.
" Id. at -, 139 N.W. at 390.
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Of course, under this analysis plaintiff could have sued the insurance
company individually for harm to his reputation without alleging any
conspiracy. Such reasoning seems apparent in Schultz because the
private eye, unlike the traders in Mogul or the race track operators, had
no independent purpose other than to earn a paycheck. 9 The result
should have been the same if defendants had ordered one of its employ-
ees to do the rough shadowing. Today, most attorneys would describe
Schultz as an archetypical privacy case,"0 but the Wisconsin court ap-
parently was not ready to take that approach." As in the other cases
reviewed, plaintiff could have stated a cause of action without mention-
ing conspiracy.2
Finally, there are those rare cases in which the existence of a con-
spiracy seems to be the basis for finding a cause of action. 3 In Deon v.
Kirby Lumber Co." an employer forced its employees to boycott plain-
tiff's store, which competed with the defendant's company store, and to
forego all social relations'with plaintiff and his family. It was held that
competitive self interest juqtified interference with patronage, but pro-
hibiting employees from associating with plaintiff's family stated a cause
of action since such a boycott of social relations could not be similarly
" The court held that plaintiff could base his claim on conspiracy and need not rely on
respondeat superior to hold the defendant insurance company liable. Id. at -, 139 N.W.
at 390.
In his original hornbook, Prosser classified Schultz as a privacy case. W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 1055 (1st ed. 1941). In his fourth edition, however, Prosser
characterized Schultz as a libel case. PROSSER, supra note 32, § 112, at 752. See also Com-
ment, 1952 Wis. L. REv. 507, 518.
81 Wisconsin courts still do not recognize the tort of invasion of privacy. See, e.g.,
Yoeckel v. Samonig, 272 Wis. 430,75 N.W.2d 925 (1956) (sustaining demurrer to complaint in
action for invasion of privacy); Judevine v. Benzies-Montayge Fuel & Warehouse Co., 222
Wis. 512, 269 N.W. 295 (1936) (holding no cause of action for invasion of privacy by printed
matter); see Comment, 1952 Wis. L. REv. 507, 520.
' The court stated that the plaintiff's pleading was not skillfully drawn. 152 Wis. at
-, 139 N.W. at 388. Apparently, plaintiff alleged a conspiracy and then asked the court
to decide how to pigeonhole the action. Id. at -, 139 N.W. at 389. One infers that counsel
knew he had a good case, but didn't know what to call it. Better to let the judges give it a
nanie. Quite possibly, counsel in Snipes adopted the same strategy. See note 47 supra.
Arguably, the "concerted refusal to deal" cases which serve as a basis for § 765 of
the Restatement of Torts should be included in the category of case in which conspiracy doc-
trine forms the basis of the action. Since unilateral refusals to deal are not actionable except
in rare instances, the joint character of the refusal to deal must be the factor which causes
illegality. We would respond that the former is an exception to the general rule. The excep-
tion is based on the courts' quite comprehensible reluctance to tell businessmen how to
operate their business and the extreme difficulties of devising a remedy in those cases in
which it has been thought necessary to require one trader to deal with another. Where the
traders act in concert, these difficulties do not exist, and such combinations will not be per-
mitted unless a valid justification is demonstrated. Today most concerted refusal to deal
cases are brought under the antitrust law because plaintiff may be able to make use of a per
se rule against concerted activity and, if successful, is entitled to triple damages. See
generally Ulrich & Howard, supra note 6, at 394-402.
" 162 La. 671, 111 So. 55 (1927).
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privileged. There are a few other decisions finding interference with
social relations by groups actionable." One might dispute whether Deon
should be classified as a conspiracy case since the employees, as well as
plaintiff, were unwilling victims of defendant's coercion. Undoubtedly,
the defendant's capacity to organize such an extensive boycott was the
controlling factor. This approach seems evident since the defendant
owner could have socially boycotted plaintiff if he chose, without incurr-
ing liability. In Deon, therefore, the "conspiracy" appears to be the sole
basis of liability.
The Conspiracy Statute in Wisconsin
Wisconsin's version of the conspiracy statute was adopted in 1887.
The statute was part of the movement then sweeping the country de-
signed to curtail the power of combinations of capital which were dis-
rupting trade6 In conjunction with the state antitrust act 7 the injuries
to business part of the statute altered the common law as stated in
Mogul." That case held that even though contracts which unreasonably
restrained trade by driving competitors out of business were void at
common law, such agreements were not actionable by third parties. The
purpose of the conspiracy statute and the antitrust laws was to make
"combinations to stifle independent, individual competition, illegal and
actionable, civilly and criminally... ."'I The two statutes provide com-
plementary remedies. The antitrust laws prohibit contracts that
unreasonably restrict competition, while the conspiracy statute expands
the common law remedy for intentionally inflicted injury to traders by
condemning joint activity justified solely by the self interest of the par-
ties.:'
The statute does have a most significant effect in criminal con-
spiracy cases. At common law a conspiracy was punishable even if the
E.g., Bear v. Reformed Mennonite Church, 462 Pa. 330, 341 A.2d 105 (1975) ("shun-
ning" by church and members is a civil wrong recognizable in court).
In the leading Wisconsin case construing the statute, State v. Huegin, 110 Wis. 189,
85 N.W. 1046 (1901), the court explained the policy of its conspiracy statute as follows:
One may, through purely malicious motives, attract to himself another's
customers and the injury be so slight in contemplation of law that "deminimis non
curat lex" applies: but when he unites others with him to maliciously injure the
business of another for the mere gratification, in whole or in part, of a desire to in-
flict such injury, the condition of there being combined force of many directed
towards another, characterized by the element of malice, renders the act of com-
bining for the particular purpose unlawful and a substantive offense ....
110 Wis. at -, 85 N.W. at 1066; see text accompanying notes 28-36 supra.
" WIs. STAT. ANN. §§ 133.01-133.19 (West Supp. 1980-81) (originally enacted as L. 1893,
c. 219, §§ 1, 2, 5; repealed and reenacted by L. 1979, c. 209, § 2).
"See text accompanying notes 37-43 supra.
" State v. Huegin, 110 Wis. 189, -, 85 N.W. 1046, 1063 (1901).
10 Hawarden v. Youghiogheny & L. Coal Co., 111 Wis. 545, 87 N.W. 472 (1901). For the
interface between the antitrust statute and the conspiracy statute worked out in Wisconsin,
see Ulrich & Howard, supra note 6, at 403-06.
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parties did nothing other than enter an illegal agreement. 71 In accord
with about half the states, Wisconsin originally required the plaintiff to
prove an overt act pursuant to the conspiracy in addition to the agree-
ment.7 2 The conspiracy statute repeals this change from the common law
by permitting the prosecutor to offer evidence of the agreement to
violate the statute to attain a valid conviction.
7
1
At what kinds of conduct is the second part of the statute aimed? By
its terms it includes all methods by which a confederation might
unlawfully restrict the activities of an individual. Its breadth is great,
for Wisconsin defines "unlawful" in the conspiracy context as not being
limited merely to criminal acts but "includ[ing] all willful, actionable
violation of civil rights. 7 4 At first blush the statute seems to be focused
upon secondary boycotts by trade unions. The classic secondary boycott
concerned the effort to require employers to employ only union labor.
Thus, assume that the union demanded that a businessman fire his non-
union workers and hired in their place union members in order to prevent
a strike. The business man is being compelled to perform acts against his
will and the nonunion man is prevented from performing a lawful act.
Thus, the statute outlaws secondary boycotts and permits primary
7 King v. Gill, 106 Eng. Rep. 341 (1818). On the subject of the overt act requirement in
criminal conspiracy cases, see W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 476-78
(1972).
u Wis. REV. STAT. § 4568 (1898) (recodified in Wis. STAT. ANN. § 939.31 (West Supp.
1981-82)).
71 In State v. Huegin, 110 Wis. 189, 85 N.W. 1046 (1901), the court explained the
history of the Wisconsin conspiracy statutes:
A combination with the malicious purpose indicated is an actionable wrong. Had it
not been for section 4568, Rev. St. 1898, adding to the common law essentials of an
indictable conspiracy the necessity for an overt act, section 4466a [the Wisconsin
conspiracy statute] would have been unnecessary to enable the courts to punish
criminally, such wrongs. That is a mere declaration of the common law. It
operates as repeal, by implication of section 4568 so far as otherwise a specific
overt act would be required to render a malicious conspiracy, to injure the trade,
business, reputation or profession of another, an offense. The old doctrine, with its
ancient meaning, should be referred to in construing 4466a.
110 Wis. at -, 85 N.W. at 1066.
The principle is the same under the Sherman Act. In footnote 59 of United States v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940), Justice Douglas emphasized that:
[C]onspiracies under the Sherman Act are not dependent on any overt act other
than the act of conspiring. It is the "contract, combination. . . or conspiracy in
restraint of trade or commerce" which § 1 of the Act strikes down, whether the
concerted activity be wholly nascent or abortive on the one hand, or successful on
the other.
Id. at 225. To recover damages, of course, private plaintiffs must show that the conspiracy
caused them harm. See note 87 infra.
11 Martens v. Reilly, 109 Wis. 464, -, 84 N.W. 840, 843 (1901). Martens was a civil
conspiracy case, but its definition of unlawful has been followed in construing the conspiracy
statute. See, e.g., Randall v. Lonstorf, 126 Wis. 147, -, 105 N.W. 663, 664 (1905); State v.
Huegin, 110 Wis. at -, 85 N.W. at 1064.
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boycotts. Yet, the Wisconsin statute expressly exempts union activities
from its prohibitions.:5
There are only two significant Wisconsin cases construing the sec-
ond part of the conspiracy statute. The best known case is Randall v.
Lonstorf 8 in which an insane plaintiff alleged a conspiracy among her
husband, his siblings and their wealthy mother to destroy her marriage.
Prior to the institution of the conspiracy suit, the wife had lost a similar
alienation of affections action"7 against her mother-in-law on the stated
ground that "to entice away a wife's husband and deprive her of his con-
sortium constitutes no injury in the law."78 The defendants cited the
earlier action as controlling precedent for the present action, arguing
that since the court had held that malicious alienation of a husband's af-
fections was not actionable where the case involved a single defendant,
the presence of multiple defendants would not change the result. 9 The
court overruled the defendant's demurrer, holding that the case was
covered by the second part of the conspiracy statute. The court reason-
ed:
By these allegations it appears that the defendants maliciously
conspired together to prevent the plaintiff from performing her
marital duties, from living with her husband, from receiving at
his hands that support to which she was entitled, from obtaining
a divorce in her home jurisdiction which should fully protect her
rights, and by reducing her to penury, compel her to allow her
husband to obtain a divorce upon false and fraudulent allegations
in a foreign jurisdiction. All these were unlawful constraints
upon the plaintiff's action and will, which the law condemns.
There can be no doubt, therefore, that the conspiracy charged
was a criminal conspiracy within the statute. Whether it would
not be criminal at common law, in the absence of a statute, we
need not consider.
Indignantly, the court told the defendants and the bar that the law does
offer redress for such flagrant wrongs, for it will never permit "con-
spirators against the marriage bond and the happiness of the family to
go 'unwhipt of justice' any more than it will allow conspirators against a
business or a profession to escape."'81
" See note 36 supra.
7' 126 Wis. 147, 105 N.W. 663 (1905).
Lonstorf v. Lonstorf, 118 Wis. 159, 95 N.W. 961 (1903).
To Id. at -, 95 N.W. at 963 (emphasis added). The court followed its prior holding in
Duffies v. Duffles, 76 Wis. 374, 45 N.W. 522 (1890), that a mother who entices away the hus-
band is not liable to the wife for loss of society or support, either under the common law or
by virtue of the Married Women's Acts. This question was much litigated at the turn of the
century with conflicting results. See T. CoOLny, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 170 (4th
ed. 1932).
Randall v. Lonstorf, 126 Wis. at - , 105 N.W. at 664.
Id. at , 105 N.W. at 664.
Id at -, 105 N.W. at 665.
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The method of reaching this result is quite interesting. In her first
action against the mother-in-law the plaintiff lost because the law
recognized no property right in her relation to her husband," but she
won in the second case because a different issue was presented. The
court stated that the issue in the second case was whether a criminal
conspiracy existed and had caused damage.' The conspiracy's object, to
have the husband desert his wife leaving her destitute, violated a
criminal statute" which brought the case within the purview of part two.
From -this "it follows that a civil action lies, although there may be no
redress for the same injuries inflicted by a single person."' 5 Of course,
under the court's theory of civil conspiracy the defendants' concerted ef-
forts to have plaintiff's husband desert her was a sufficient "unlawful"
act since it violated a criminal statute.'
The Randall decision raises an interesting question: if the wife had
no legally protectable interest in her husband's consortium and support,
why did her interest arise solely because two people conspired to
deprive her of it? Is the joint violation of the criminal statute crucial?
Many cases exist in which courts have refused to give remedies to plain-
tiffs injured by conspiracies which violated a criminal statute on the
ground that no legally protectable interest has been harmed." Certainly,
the court was aware that the opposite result was available.
What implications ought to be drawn from this case with regard to
the second part of the statute? First, one could view the Randall out-
come as being limited to its appealing facts. Randall only holds that
where a number of people gang up on a wife to alienate her spouse's af-
fections, she may recover." The limits of such action seem well defined.
I See Duffies v. Duffies, 76 Wis. at -, 45 N.W. at 525 (one who entices away
another's husband not liable to wife for damages). Non-recognition of a wife's property right
in the marriage seems to be based on the position taken by Blackstone that "the inferior
[the wife] hath no kind of property in the company, care or assistance of the superior, or the
superior is to have in the inferior, therefore the inferior can suffer no loss of injury." T.
COOLEY, A. TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 170 (4th ed 1932). Compare the position of
Soames Forsyte in J. GALSWORTHY, THE FORSYTE SAGA (1922).
126 Wis. at - , 105 N.W. at 664.
WIS. REV. STAT. § 4587c (1898).
126 Wis. at - , 105 N.W. at 664-65.
In his article Conspiracy as a Crime, and as a Tort, Professor Burdick cites Randall
v. Lonstorf as authority for the proposition that conspiracy is a separate tort. He does not
mention the existence of the conspiracy statute. 7 COLUM. L. REV. 229, 239-41 (1907).
" See, e.g., Collier v. Stamatis, 63 Ariz. 285,162 P.2d 125 (1945) (parents of fifteen year
old girl who became delinquent because of drinking liquor sold by defendants in violation of
statute denied recovery). In private antitrust cases, plaintiffs often are precluded from
recovering for harm inflicted by violators on the ground of lack of standing or no harm to an
interest in property. See, e.g., In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution M.D.L. No. 31, 481
F.2d 122 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973). See generally 2 P. AREEDA & D.
TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS Or ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION,
3G, at 160-227 (1978).
" For example, the Wisconsin court did not overrule Lonstorf v. Lontorf in Randall.
See text accompanying notes 76-79 supra. Of course, the rule of Lonstorf v. Lonstorf could
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It would not necessarily increase the wife's rights in the marital
relation 9 So viewed, the decision in no way affects the court's overall
scheme of handling family relations, yet it sets up a rule which will be
easy to administer 5 On the other hand, Randall could be viewed as a
nascent statement by the Wisconsin court that it intended to authorize a
civil recovery for all joint activity intentionally harming another unless
the defendant offers a valid justification. Like the antitrust laws,9' the
conspiracy statute is a legislative mandate to the court to develop on a
case by case basis a new standard of legality for joint activity.
The Schultz "rough shadowing" decision,92 the other significant deci-
sion 93 in Wisconsin invoking the second part of the statute, seemed to
take this latter course. Not only did the Schultz court create a cause of
action for plaintiff by analogizing rough shadowing to libel, but the case
further held that, if the defendants maliciously hindered plaintiff from
leaving town, they violated the conspiracy statute since he was
prevented "from doing or performing a lawful act."'" What seems of
special significance is that the court itself suggested to plaintiff how a
theory founded on conspiracy might serve his case9
Since Schultz is the last case in which the second part of the statute
served as a basis for suit, and even then it may not have been control-
ling, our previous comments may be merely a rhapsody on what might
have been. Why the statute has fallen into disuse is unclear. Given the
have been founded on the ground that a mother's advice and counsel to her child is condi-
tionally privileged. See White v. White, 140 Wis. 538, 122 N.W. 1051 (1909); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 686 (1977).
" Randall does not mean that a wife has a complementary action for loss of the hus-
band's consortium or services even if the law recognizes a cause of action for such losses due
to injuries to the wife in his favor.
"See Green, The Duty Problem In Negligence Cases, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 1014,1035-45
(1928).
1 See AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANIALYSIs 5 (3d ed. 1980):
Federal antitrust laws are very much simplier than commercial codes or tax
statutes. The basic statute, the Sherman Act, simply condemns (1) contracts, com-
binations and conspiracy restraint of trade, and (2) monopolization, combinations
to monopolize, or attempts to monopolize. Although this is a statutory subject and
we are concerned with statutory interpretation, the prohibition of trade
restraints and monoplization is extremely vague and general. Indeed, the Sher-
man Act may be little more than a legislative command that the judiciary develop
a common law of antitrust.
See text accompanying note 54-62 supra.
" Several other decisions invoking the second part of the statute are clearly the pro-
geny of Randall. White v. White, 132 Wis. 121, 111 N.W. 1116 (1907) (overruling a
demurrer); 140 Wis. 538, 122 N.W. 1051 (1909) (holding that husband was not a necessary
party defendant in alienation of affctions suit); Jones v. Monson, 137 Wis. 478, 119 N.W.
179 (1909) (alienation of affections suit by parents of the wife).
" 152 Wis. at -, 139 N.W. at 391. The alternative theory may have been of little
assistance to plaintiff since a valid privilege for rough shadowing probably also would
demonstrate a privilege under the conspiracy statute.
"Id. at -, 139 N.W. at 391.
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court's broad definition of "unlawful"" in conspiracy cases and its recur-
rent statements that the statute is declaratory of the common law,
Wisconsin attorneys may have concluded that it added nothing to their
present arsenal of remedies for harmful joint conduct. After all, both
Randall and Schultz could have reached their results in the absence of
the conspiracy statute.
A Proposed Construction
In interpreting the compelling and constraining sections of the
statute, Virginia courts will write on a clean slate. While Virginia does
recognize the tort of civil conspiracy, no decision as yet has attempted to
outline its features. 7 Although several cases have mentioned the first
part of the statute,98 the second part is still virgin territory. As we have
See text accompanying note 74 supra.
Gallop v. Sharp, 179 Va. 335, 195 S.E.2d 84 (1942); Werth v. Fire Companies'Adjust-
ment Bureau, Inc., 160 Va. 845, 171 S.E. 255, cert. denied, 290 U.S. 659 (1933); and Crump v.
Commonwealth, 84 Va. 927, 6 S.E. 620 (1888) all hold that Virginia recognizes civil con-
spiracy as a distinct tort. Of these, Werth seems the most significant. That case involved an
alleged conspiracy among insurance companies to organize an affiliate of insurance in-
vestigators who would work exclusively for the former for the alleged purpose of excluding
independents such as plaintiff. The court held, apparently, that since no insurance company
was coerced into hiring any particular investigator but could hire whom they pleased the
combination operated a lawful business by lawful means. 160 Va. at 856, 171 S.E. at 259.
Other Virginia conspiracy cases concern interference with a lawful contract. Worrie v. Boze,
198 Va. 533, 95 S.E.2d 192 (1956) (conspiracy to breach lawful contract actionable in tort ac-
tion); Stauffer v. Fredricksburg Ramada, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 1136 (E.D. Va. 1976); Griffith v.
Electrolux, 454 F. Supp. 29 (E.D. Va. 1976) (need party other than those privy to contract to
use tort theory of Worrie). The distinction made by the federal courts demonstrates that all
interference with contract cases could be viewed as conspiracy cases since there must be
two parties involved, one in contractual relations with plaintiff and one seeking to breach
the contract.
" Moore v. Allied Chemical Corp., 480 F. Supp. 364 (E.D. Va. 1979) and Federated
Graphics Cos. v. Napotnik, 424 F. Supp. 291 (E.D. Va. 1976) were discussed in our prior arti-
cle. See Ulrich and Howard, supra note 6, at 383-85. Two decisions just published seem wor-
thy of note. In Picture Lake Campground v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 497 F. Supp. 858 (E.D. Va.
1980), the court, before dismissing the case on the ground that plaintiff lacked standing to
sue, asserted that the only difference between a common law claim for tortious injury to
business and the statutory action under VA. CODE §§ 18.2-499 to 500 is that the statute re-
quires a conspiracy. Id. at 864. In Ward v. Conner, 495 F. Supp. 434 (E.D. Va. 1980), the
plaintiff alleged that defendants, his relatives and the family priest, conspired to "de-
program" his religious beliefs. Among the many theories alleged by plaintiff was one under
§ 18.2-499 that the defendants "conspired to represent plaintiff as being of unsound mind in
an effort to obtain a conservatorship over him and, in doing so, harmed his reputation." Id.
at 439. The court, relying on Federated Graphics, supra, held that only harm to business
reputations were actionable under the statute and dismissed this count. Id. Plaintiff might
also have used the compelling and constraining part of the statute for he alleged that his
movements were restrained for thirty days. Since he also asserted a false imprisonment




just noted, the Wisconsin experience with the statute offers limited
guidance as to its proper construction.9
Let us note the possible approaches by working through two ex-
amples. First, how would Schultz have been decided in Virginia? In the
absence of section 18.2-499, the plaintiff probably would have lost. Since
Virginia disfavors the tort of libel,00 one may infer that it would not aid
the plaintiff by a creative analogy as did the Wisconsin court."1 Nor
could Schultz have relied on the tort of invasion of privacy, since
Virginia does not recognize this cause of action.' Does the statute's sec-
ond part affect the result? Following the Wisconsin court's statement
that the statute merely is declaratory of the common law, 0' a Virginia
judge might hold that the statute creates no new rights, but merely im-
poses criminal sanctions when conspirators wrongfully invade the civil
rights of another. The civil conspiracy decisions from other jurisdictions
might serve as guides to construction, with the criminal character of the
statute inclining the bench toward the more conservative holdings."4
Since the defendants' acts were not wrongful if judged by ordinary tort
standards because no recognized interest of the plaintiff's was invaded,"'
it follows that the statute would not aid the plaintiff in Virginia.
See text accompanying notes 76-96 supra.
10 Where a written publication is defamatory on its face, i.e., the words hold the plain-
tiff up to hatred, contempt or ridicule, or cause him to be shunned or avoided, plaintiff need
not plead or prove special damages to recover for injury. Some jurisdictions hold, however,
that where extrinsic facts are required to demonstrate the defamatory meaning intended,
this is libel "Per Quod" and is treated like slander. Thus, where the libel per quod rule
prevails, plaintiff may recover only by proof of special damages unless the imputation falls
into one of the four slander categores-imputation of a crime, a loathsome disease, in-
competence in one's trade, business, profession or office, or unchastity in a female. See
generally the dispute between Prosser & Eldredge in Prosser, Libel Per Quod, 46 VA. L.
RE.v. 839 (1960); Eldredge, The Spurious Rule of Libel Per Quod, 79 HARv. L. REv. 733
(1966); Prosser, More Libel Per Quod, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1629 (1966). Virginia has gone even
further than the libel per quod jurisdictions. In Virginia, all libel is treated like slander even
if the written statement is defamatory on its face. Carwile v. Richmond Newspapers, Inc.,
196 Va. 1, 82 S.E.2d 588 (1959); M. Rosenberg & Sons, Inc. v. Craft, 182 Va. 512, 29 S.E.2d
375 (1944). Moreover, the Virginia Supreme Court has assimilated actions under the
"fighting words" statute, VA. CODE § 8.01-45 (1977) as much as possible to that of defama-
tion. Shupe v. Rose's Stores, Inc., 213 Va. 374, 192 S.E.2d 766 (1972); W.T. Grant Co. v.
Owens, 149 Va. 906, 141 S.E. 860 (1928). See generally Note, Defamation in Virginia-A
Merger of Libel and Slander, 47 VA. L. REv. 1116 (1961).
,'0 Wisconsin appears to follow the libel per quod rule. Kassowitz v. Sentinel Co., 226
Wis. 468, 277 N.W. 177 (1938). The argument of the court in Schultz indicates that it viewed
a cartoon depicting plaintiff being rough shadowed as libelous on its face. See note 57 supra.
A Virginia court probably would not view the matter in the same way because the cartoon
would not fall within one of the four slander categories. See note 100 supra.
11 Evans v. Sturgill, 430 F. Supp. 1209 (W.D. Va. 1977), followed in Ward v. O'Connor,
495 F. Supp. 434, 440 (E.D. Va. 1980).
"' State v. Huegin, 110 Wis. 189, 85 N.W. 1046, 1064 (1901). See also Picture Lake
Campground, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 497 F. Supp. 858 (E.D. Va. 1980).
"4 See text accompanying notes 13-65 supra.
The original question in Schultz, for example, was whether rough shadowing
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In contrast, the court could adopt the seemingly more expansive
reading of Randall and Schultz suggested above."' Under that reasoning
the statute manifests a legislative intent to create a "prima facie tort"
liability in favor of any person intentionally injured by concerted
action.0 7 Once the plaintiff establishes his injury, the burden falls on
those causing his harm to establish privilege. The restraint on Schultz's
mobility or the repeated interference with his everyday affairs, both of
which the statute expressly prohibits, would be the focus of attention.
This violation of his civil rights qualifies as a wrong even if the defen-
dants committed no nominate tort. In other words, the statute declares
certain concerted action wrongful, even though the same action by an in-
dividual would be permitted."8 Having established a prima facie case of
maliciously inflicted harm, plaintiff could recover for any injury suffered
due to the restraint, parasitic damages,"' and possibly punitives,10
unless a privilege was established.
violated any interest of the plaintiffs which the law deems worthy of protection. The court
answered "yes" due to the potential injury to plaintiffs reputation. Since Virginia courts do
not protect the values incident to reputation as strongly as Wisconsin's it is likely that a
Virginia judge would inform Schultz that no cognizable interest of his had been violated.
See notes 100-02 supra. In this regard, compare Evans v. Sturgill, 430 F. Supp. 1209 (W.D.
Va. 1977), in which plaintiff's attempt to invoke any number of theories on facts as compel-
ling as Schultz failed on this basis, with Ms. Lonstorff's difficulties, text accompanying
notes 79-89, supra.
"o See text accompanying notes 91 and 96 supra.
117 See text accompanying note 91 supra. As we view this matter, the statute would
perform an interstitial function. Where the plaintiff could not show harm due to a recognized
tort, the statute would be the plaintiffs vehicle to the jury so long as the judge agreed that
the defendants' action ought to be actionable. See F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF
TORTS, Chap. 15 (1956).
1 See text accompanying notes 79-81 supra.
' Professor Dobbs offers the following explanation of parasitic damages:
Damages are ... awarded in a variety of cases in which the injury is essentially
non-pecuniary. This is true with many of the dignitary interests that receive pro-
tection either separately or parasitically to some other, more economic interest.
For instance, the plaintiff against whom a harmful battery has been perpetrated,
may be entitled to recover for mental anguish as well, parasitic to the recovery
for the battery.... In all these cases courts have spoken of damages as compen-
satory, but the term is misleading. They are no doubt compensatory in the sense
that they are not merely nominal and in the sense that they are not necessarily
punitive. They are not, however, compensatory in the sense that they represent a
money reward for a money loss or one measurable in money. The real purpose in
such cases is to establish and vindicate a right that is deemed important, even
though not pecuniary in its immediate consequence.
DOBBS, REMEDIES § 3.1, at 135-36 (1973). For illustrations of recoveries for mental distress
parasitic to some other cause of action, see PROSSER, supra note 32, § 12.
" In Virginia a party may recover punitive damages only where the act complained of
is accompanied by circumstances of aggravation, such as fraud, malice, oppression, or such
circumstances as show an absolute disregard of the right of others. See, e.g., Virginia Ry.
and Power Co. v. House, 148 Va. 879, 139 S.E. 480 (1927).
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If civil liability alone were authorized, we would prefer the second
construction. Although liability would be limited to joint activities only,
this result is a good beginning. Society need not tolerate oppressive
group activity, and those inflicting harm on others should be compelled
to justify their conduct or pay."' Further, the court could manipulate the
concept of conspiracy to expand liability where justice so requires.1 '2 Our
construction, therefore, would place the focus of the case on the defen-
dant's reasons for inflicting harm. Such a focus is proper.' For example,
the defendants in Schultz might have justified their shadowing of the
plaintiff on the ground that they wanted to prove a fraudulent connec-
tion between him and the party for whom Schultz planned to testify.'
To this assertion plaintiff might respond that rough shadowing was un-
necessary, even counterproductive. A court might agree that the defen-
dants failed to state a complete privilege, yet could offer its reasons as
mitigation."1 Our point is that the privilege asserted is the crucial aspect
"I See text accompanying notes 26-27 supra (policy reasons behind need to control op-
pressive group activity).
112 VA. CODE § 18.2-501(b) (1975) defines a "person" as any person, firm, corporation,
partnership or association. This definition is similar to that found in the Virginia Antitrust
Act in which person "includes, unless the context otherwise requires, any natural person,
any trust or association of persons, formal or otherwise, any corporation, partnership, com-
pany, or other legal or commercial entity." VA. CODE § 59.1-9.3(a) (1975). The definition of
"person" in the current Virginia Antitrust Statute is clearly broader than the one found in
the preceeding antitrust statute. VA. CODE § 59.1-22(a) (1968). The language of § 18.2-501(b)
is sufficiently indefinite to support any results. The writers are aware of a holding in a
Lynchburg Circuit Court that a corporate officer, acting on corporate business, may "con-
spire" with his employer for the purpose of this statute. This seems but a small step beyond
the Wisconsin treatment of conspiracy in the Schultz case, text accompanying notes 59-62
supra. In Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968), the Supreme Court virtually read the
conspiracy requirement out of § 1 of the Sherman Act. Id at 150 n.6. Manipulation of the
conspiracy concept by courts dealing with § 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act to attain "pro-
per" results is discussed by AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYsIs 334 (3rd ed. 1981). Cf. Schultz's
treatment, text accompanying note 54-62, supra.
1's Prosser defines privilege in the following fashion:
"Privilege" is the modern term applied to those considerations which avoid liability
where it otherwise might follow. In its broader sense, it is applied to any immunity
which prevents the existence of a tort; but in its more common usage, it signifies
that the defendant has acted to further an interest of such social importance that
it is entitled to protection, even at the expense of damage to the plaintiff. He is
allowed freedom of action because his own interests, or those of the public require
it, and social policy will be best served by permitting it. The boundaries of the
privilege are marked out by our current ideas of what will most effectively pro-
mote the general welfare.
PROSSER, supra note 32, § 16, at 98.
1I Defense counsel asserted that Schultz was a "self confessed perjurer, drunkard and
convict." 152 Wis. at -, 139 N.W. at 391. These-facts gave ground for an investigation of
plaintiffs day to day conduct. Another potential justification seems inherent; defendant
could assert that the imputation was true, that is, Schultz's character was so bad that he
was a person who ought to be watched.
115 The Schultz decision adopted this approach. Id. at -, 139 N.W. at 391. The bad
character of the plaintiff in Schultz worked against him in that analog to libel since primary
recovery was for damage to reputation.
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of the case, and that our proposed construction mandates that the court
focus upon it.
To further illustrate our preferred construction, let us against con-
sider11 the case of the employee-at-will whose employment is terminated
for reasons that are contrary to public policy. Such cases fall within the
retaliatory discharge doctrine.117 For example, take the case of the
female employee who alleges that she was discharged because she rebuffed
the sexual advances of a supervisor who, to retaliate, subsequently
fabricated a complaint of poor job performance."' Virginia apparently
does not authorize relief for this plaintiff on the ground, long recognized
at common law, that an employer may hire and fire at his pleasure.1 We
suggest that the second part of the statute should be read to offer this
plaintiff redress. Arguably, a conspiracy between the supervisor and the
company exists, since the supervisor was not acting within the scope of
his duties in seeking the dismissal of the plaintiff.20 The discharge from
employment constrains her from performing a lawful act, much in the
way the civil rights of the wife in Randall and the witness in Schultz
were restricted. Finally, the discharge was malicious in the sense that it
could not be justified. A privilege cannot be based on a purpose which
contravenes public policy. 2'
We understand that our approach to part two of the statute would
not be of aid to many employees wrongfully discharged. In the majority
of these cases no conspiracy will be present. The facts of Harless v. First
National Bank" illustrate our point. An employee of a bank complained
to his superiors about current lending practices of the bank which
violated federal law. When the employee informed the federal authori-
ties of these irregularities, he was fired. Presumably, the discharge of
plaintiff could not be justified solely on the ground that such was in the
best interests of the bank, since a privilege cannot be founded on the
need to conceal a violation of law. Yet, since the plaintiff's superiors
were acting in the bank's interest, as opposed to their own, no con-
118 See Ulrich & Howard, supra note 6, at 380-85.
11? See generally Peck, Unjust Discharges from Employment. A Necessary Change in
the Law, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1979); Note, Protecting at Will Employees Against Wrongful
Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only In Good Faith, 93 HARv. L. REV. 1816 (1980).
Everyone who has written on the subject agrees that the common law rule permitting ter-
mination of an employee at the pleasure of the employer is unjust and ought to be changed.
What the rule should be and the procedure to best implement it are much disputed.
118 The facts in the example in the text are taken from Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114
N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974).
11 See Blevins v. General Electric Co., 491 F. Supp. 521 (W.D. Va. 1980).
12 See, e.g., Johnston v. Baker, 445 F.2d 424 (3rd Cir. 1971); Christopher v. General
Computer Systems, Inc., 560 S.W.2d 698 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977).
1 See note 113 supra. In the Monge case, from which our illustration was taken, the
court stated this proposition by saying that "[A bad faith termination] is not in the best in-
terests of the economic system or the public good." 114 N.H. at 132, 316 A.2d at 551.
122 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1978).
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spiracy would be present. ' Such an analysis negates much of the poten-
tial of part two of the conspiracy statutes for this area and others.
Nonetheless, when one considers the nature of the conspiracy concept,
even this attenuated warning might be worthwhile.
Repeal of the Conspiracy Statute
The better alternative, in our opinion, is to repeal both parts of the
conspiracy statute. We foresee little benefit flowing from it, but the
possible harms caused by its continued existence seem substantial. In
our prior article we set forth our basis for abolishing the triple damages
remedy for violation of the injuries to business part of the statute.'
Without a triple damages remedy thii section should be viewed as
declaratory of the common law.'2' While its retention in this form would
have no appreciable effect on Virginia tort law, its repeal would abolish
the criminalpenalty. For the reasons set out below, we favor repeal.
126
The breadth of the compelling and restraining part of the statute is
unsettling. It makes criminal any concerted activity for the purpose of
compelling another either to act against his will or to refrain from doing
a lawful deed. To illustrate our fear, we set forth an outlandish example.
Suppose my wife and I agree to do everything within our power to pre-
vent our neighbor Jones from cutting down a large oak tree in his front
yard. To secure our goal we organize all of our neighbors to socially
boycott Jones and his family in order to save the tree. Under our pre-
ferred construction, my wife and I appear to have violated the statute by
organizing this social boycott. Although we have less coercive power
than the employer in Deon,1" a judge might find our conduct beyond ac-
ceptable community standards, especially under a statute apparently
designed to prevent pressure tactics. To avoid liability, we would be
forced to establish a privilege for our conduct. Even a judge sympathetic
to our environmental and aesthetic concerns might well hold that the in-
terests we tried to foster were not as important as those invaded by our
boycott.12'
I See W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 4884, at 385
(rev. perm. ed. 1978).
A corporation cannot conspire with itself any more than an individual can,
and hence it appears to be the general rule that a corporation can not conspire
with its officers, agents or employees when they are acting solely for the corpora-
tion.
Id. See also Fowler v. Dept. of Education, 472 F. Supp. 121 (ED. Va. 1978) (two officials of
state department of education acting within the scope of their employment cannot be held
liable as conspirators under VA. CODE § 18.2-499 (a)).
' See Ulrich & Howard, supra note 6, at 410-12.
125 See, e.g., Picture Lake Campground v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 497 F. Supp. 858, 863-64
(E.D. Va. 1980); State v. Huegin, 110 Wis. 189, 85 N.W. 1046, 1062 (1901).
See note 136 infra.
See discussion of Deon v. Kirby Lumber Co., 162 La. 671, 111 So. 55 (La. 1927), and
text accompanying notes 63-65 supra.
I See note 113 supra.
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Assuming that the two of us ought to pay damages to Jones, there is
the more pressing question of criminal liability. If the local prosecutor
wished to pursue the matter, we would be subjected to a criminal fine as
well as tort damages." In fact, we could be held criminally responsible
even if our activities caused Jones no actual harm, or if we had agreed on
a course of conduct but had done nothing to achieve our purpose, for the
statute makes the agreement itself illegal.' In this regard, note that the
potential scope of liability is quite broad. Those persons living on the
block who knowingly shared our purpose apparently have violated the
statute even though they were not parties to our agreement.'
Our illustration points up both the vagueness and the all encompass-
ing character of the statute. We can readily understand why the legisla-
ture originally included a severability clause." Without the clause, the
likelihood that the second part of the statute would be declared un-
constitutional on this ground is high."' Couple this with the procrustean
nature of the crime of conspiracy and you have created a potent weapon
in the hand of any prosecutor. The prosecutor is in position to define the
crime as he thinks fit."4 Given the alleged "anti sit-in" impetus for the
statute's birth, such fears do not seem chimerical."' All of this makes the
statute's second part as much a sleeping giant as the first.
In Virginia it has long been established that a private party may employ a, private
prosecutor to assist the Commonwealth's Attorney in particular instances. McCue v. Com-
monwealth, 103 Va. 870, 49 S.E. 623 (1905); Sawyer v. Commonwealth, 88 Va. 356, 13 S.E.
708 (1891). By hiring this assistant, Smith could place great pressure on the public prose-
cutor to proceed against us.
"' See note 17 supra.
111 Whited v. Commonwealth, 174 Va. 528, 6 S.E.2d 647 (1940), holds that one who aided
and abetted in the commission of a crime but did not share the criminal intent of the actual
perpetrator may not be convicted of conspiracy. Presumably, if the defendants share this
criminal purpose, as did those on the block joining Smith and myself, they could be held as
conspirators by aiding and abetting us even in the absence of an agreement.
The pertinent part of the prior statute provided:
2. That if any part or parts, section, subsection, sentence, clause or phrase of
this Act or the application thereof to any person or circumstance is for any reason
declared unconstitutional, such decision shall not affect the validity of the remain-
ing portions of this act which shall remain in the force as if such act had been passed
with the unconstitutional part or parts, section, subsection, sentence, clause,
phrase or such application thereof eliminated; and the general assembly hereby
declares that it would have passed this Act if such unconstitutional part or parts,
section, subsection, sentence, clause or phrase had not been included herein, or if
such application had not been made.
VA. CODE § 18.1-74.1:3 (b) 2. (Supp. 1964). When the conspiracy statute was redrafted and
moved to Va. Code § 18.2-199 to 501, the severability clause was deleted.
18 See, e.g., Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972). We note that the
constitutionality of the statute was upheld in Huegin v. State, affd sub nom Aikens v.
Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194 (1904), but the focus in the case was upon the injuries to business
part of the statute.
1" See generally Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE, & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMNAL PROCEDURE,
811-34 (4th ed. 1974).
" See Ulrich & Howard, supra note 6, at notes 14-16. In addition, see Boothe, Civil
Rights in Virginia, 35 VA. L. REv. 928 (1949).
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We doubt that the repeal of the compelling or constraining section
will unduly restrict the evolution of tort law concerning joint activities.
The civil conspiracy doctrine is sufficiently flexible to deal with unique
cases such as Randall and Schultz.138 The adequacy of the civil remedy is
suggested by the fact that these cases stand practically alone under the
Wisconsin statute. If that statute were an important means of redress
apart from the common law, one would expect the Wisconsin plaintiff's
bar to invoke it with some regularity. Instead, the statute is practically
ignored.
'M See text accompanying note 96 supra.
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